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Second-Parent Adoption and the Equitable Parent 
Doctrine: The Future of Custody and Visitation Rights 
for Same-Sex Partners in Missouri 
Heather Buethe* 
INTRODUCTION 
In today’s world, the concept of family is being redefined. The 
traditional family, consisting of a father, a mother, and a few children 
living happily together in one home, is no longer the norm. Divorce is 
at an all-time high, with nearly one of every two marriages ending in 
divorce.1 Fragmented families are left to build new lives and to 
perhaps establish relationships that bring together a patchwork of 
people.  
As one of the driving forces behind the redefinition of family, 
same-sex couples continue to fight for equal treatment in areas such 
as marriage and child rearing. In fact, new reproductive technologies 
and adoption possibilities have increased the options of same-sex 
couples who wish to raise children. This, in turn, increases the 
urgency for courts and legislatures to create laws and policies that 
provide guidance on these issues. 
 * J.D. (2006), Washington University School of Law; B.A. Business Administration: 
Finance & Marketing (2001), Truman State University. The author would like to thank the 
attorneys at Voices for Children in St. Louis for their inspiration and support. 
 1. Matthew D. Bramlett & William D. Mosher, First Marriage Dissolution, Divorce, and 
Remarriage: United States (Ctr. for Disease Control, Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Advance 
Data No. 323, 2001), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad323.pdf. This report 
found that forty-three percent of first marriages end in separation or divorce within fifteen 
years. Id. at 6. In 2002, the Census Bureau projected that nearly half of recent first marriages 
would end in divorce. ROSE M. KREIDER & JASON M. FIELDS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NUMBER, 
TIMING, AND DURATION OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES: 1996, at 1 (2002), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p70-80.pdf. This report shows increased percentages of 
people divorcing during the last half of the twentieth century. Id. at 19. 
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Just as traditional family relationships can dissolve, same-sex 
couples can end their partnerships. However, after the separation, the 
stakes are higher for same-sex couples when there are children 
involved and the non-legal parent seeks custody or visitation rights. 
Although some states permit legal adoption by a second parent,2 
many states are ill-prepared to deal with custody and visitation 
conflicts between same-sex couples.3 In fact, some states prohibit 
homosexual parents from having custody or visitation rights, and 
refuse to recognize that the concept of family is changing and that the 
traditional family is being redefined.4 Instead, these states make 
decisions and pass legislation based on false stereotypes and 
homophobia.5  
Judges, legislators, and social scientists alike are constantly faced 
with the question of how to deal with today’s nontraditional families 
and their dissolutions. Fortunately, flexible state statutes, new 
legislative opportunities and equitable doctrines may ease the 
difficult task of deciding when to allow third parties to assume the 
rights of legal parents. Missouri has failed to take advantage of these 
legal vehicles, and has therefore left homosexual parents and their 
 2. See infra note 46. 
 3. See infra notes 53–55. 
 4. See infra note 57. 
 5. Kathryn Kendell, The Custody Challenge: Debunking Myths About Lesbian and Gay 
Parents and Their Children, FAM. ADVOC., Summer 1997, at 21. Kendell highlighted four 
myths about children of gay or lesbian parents: (1) “Children of lesbian or gay parents will be 
subjected to substantial harassment;” (2) “Children raised by lesbian or gay parents will not 
develop appropriate gender identity;” (3) “Children of lesbian or gay parents will grow up gay;” 
and (4) “Children of lesbian or gay parents have poor self-esteem.” Id. at 21–24. Kendell 
concludes that there is no basis for any of these myths. See id. at 21–26. With respect to the first 
myth, studies indicate that peer pressure is not a significant problem. See, e.g., Mary E. Hotvedt 
& Jane Barclay Mandel, Children of Lesbian Mothers, in HOMOSEXUALITY: SOCIAL, 
PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL ISSUES 275, 282 (William Paul et al. eds., 1982). Studies 
also indicate that the sexual orientation of a child’s parent is not determinative of that child’s 
sexual orientation. See, e.g., Susan Golombok & Fiona Tasker, Do Parents Influence the Sexual 
Orientation of Their Children? Findings from a Longitudinal Study of Lesbian Families, 32 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 3 (1996); Julie Schwartz Gottman, Children of Gay and Lesbian 
Parents, in HOMOSEXUALITY AND FAMILY RELATIONS 177, 189 (Frederick W. Bozett & 
Marvin B. Sussman eds., 1990). In addition, Judith Stacey and Timothy Biblarz found that 
rather than struggling with gender identity or having poor self-esteem, “children of same-sex 
parents develop in less gender-stereotypical ways,” and “their experiences give them greater 
sensitivity, empathy for social diversity, and capacity to express feeling.” Judith Stacey & 
Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter?, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 
159 (2001). 
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children to face even greater difficulties and heartbreak following the 
dissolution of a relationship. 
Part I of this Note discusses the current law regarding family, 
children and homosexuals at the Supreme Court level and among 
various states. Part II examines empirical data regarding the fitness of 
homosexual parents and the effect such parents have on children. Part 
III discusses second-parent adoption and the equitable parent 
doctrine, and identifies those states currently employing such devices 
to resolve custody disputes. Part IV offers an analysis of the law of 
Missouri as compared to that of other states. Part V proposes 
statutory reform by the Missouri legislature to allow second-parent 
adoptions, and, in the interim, an effort by the courts to extend rights 
and responsibilities to legitimate second-parents by employing broad 
statutory interpretation or by applying principles of equity and 
fairness.  
I. THE LAW REGARDING FAMILIES, CHILDREN AND HOMOSEXUALS 
Courts and legislators have struggled with how to approach same-
sex couples, their desire to be parents and the consequences if they 
terminate the relationship. Many courts recognize changing family 
dynamics and the disappearance of the “traditional family,” and have 
discovered or created ways to provide rights to members of 
nontraditional families.6  
The Supreme Court has offered some guidance to the states by 
protecting family relationships and employing a liberal interpretation 
of the word “family.”7 Protection of family relationships began with 
Meyer v. Nebraska8 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,9 in which the 
Court placed the parent-child relationship within the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s realm of privacy.10 This limited the states’ ability to 
interfere with parents’ decisions regarding child rearing and 
education.11 
 6. See infra notes 11, 19–22. 
 7. See infra notes 8–16. 
 8. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 9. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 10. Id. at 533–34; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
 11. Although not declared as such by Meyer or Pierce, the right to bring up one’s child as 
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Subsequently, Prince v. Massachusetts12 suggested that the family 
is not beyond state regulation, and that a parent’s fundamental right 
to control a child’s upbringing can be limited by the state’s interest as 
parens patriae to protect the child’s well-being or to keep the child 
from being harmed.13 However, the Court again acknowledged the 
importance of protecting families from governmental intrusion in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder,14 in which it recognized parental authority in 
child rearing.15 As a result of these cases, it is clear that the Supreme 
Court protects a parent’s right to guide the upbringing of his or her 
child, provided the decision does not place the child in harm’s way.16 
In addition to giving deferring to parental decisions in a familial 
relationship, the Court has refused to adopt a narrow definition of 
family that would limit constitutional protection of those within the 
traditional family realm. For example, in Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland,17 the Court disallowed a single family zoning ordinance 
that excluded a family consisting of a grandmother, her son, his child 
and another grandchild.18 The Court recognized the need to adopt a 
broad definition of family to “protect[] the sanctity of the family.”19 
one sees fit is recognized as a fundamental right. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 
(1982) (holding that the rights of the natural parents in the care, custody and management of 
their children is a fundamental right and cannot be severed using the “fair preponderance of the 
evidence” standard); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (acknowledging the 
fundamental right of parents to guide the religious upbringing of their children). The legacy of 
Meyer and Pierce is the promotion of pluralism and the idea that families cannot be 
standardized. These ideas were echoed by the dissent in Michael H. v. Gerald D.: 
We are not an assimilative, homogeneous society, but a facilitative, pluralistic one, in 
which we must be willing to abide someone else’s unfamiliar or even repellant practice 
because the same tolerant impulse protects our own idiosyncracies. Even if we can 
agree, therefore, that “family” and “parenthood” are part of the good life, it is absurd 
to assume that we can agree on the content of those terms and destructive to pretend 
that we do. 
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 12. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
 13. Id. at 166. 
 14. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205. 
 15. Id. at 233–34. 
 16. See id. 
 17. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
 18. Id. at 506. 
 19. Id. at 503. Justice Powell explained: “Our decisions establish that the Constitution 
protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol20/iss1/10
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The Court expanded the definition of family further in Smith v. 
Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform20 by 
acknowledging that family is not limited to blood, marriage, or 
adoption.21 Despite this expanded definition of family, the Court 
refused to grant constitutional protection to a foster family, holding 
that the family contracted with the state and therefore knew that the 
rights and responsibilities of foster parenting did not include 
constitutional protection.22  
In 2000, the Court further restricted the statutory rights of third 
parties in Troxel v. Granville.23 In Troxel, the Court struck down 
Washington’s grandparent visitation statute, thereby strengthening 
the rights of parents to determine with whom a child associates and 
narrowing the statutory authority of third parties in child custody and 
visitation disputes.24 The Court has yet to hear a case regarding the 
equitable parent doctrine25 as applied to third parties. 
Just as the Court has acknowledged the importance of family and 
parental rights, it has also exhibited an even greater determination to 
protect the rights of children. In Plyler v. Doe,26 the Court upheld a 
child’s right to education and refused to punish children for the 
in this Nation’s history and tradition. . . . Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for 
the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family.” Id. at 503–04. 
 20. 431 U.S. 816 (1977). 
 21. Id. at 843–44. 
[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the 
society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily 
association, and from the role it plays in “promot[ing] a way of life” through the 
instruction of children . . . as well as from the fact of blood relationship. No one would 
seriously dispute that a deeply loving and interdependent relationship between an adult 
and a child in his or her care may exist even in the absence of a blood relationship. 
Id. at 844 (citations omitted). 
 22. Id. at 845–46. 
 23. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). The court acknowledged that “[t]he demographic changes of the 
past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family.” Id. at 63. However, the 
Court struck down Washington’s visitation statute on the grounds that it was unconstitutional as 
applied because the order for grandparent visitation unjustifiably interfered with the natural 
mother’s due process right to make decisions concerning the “care, custody, and control” of her 
children. Id. at 72. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See infra note 59. 
 26. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).  
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mistakes of their parents, who were illegal immigrants.27 The 
Massachusetts Supreme Court reiterated this principle when it 
acknowledged that it is unfair to punish children of same-sex couples, 
who do not have a choice as to their parentage.28  
The Supreme Court signaled its changing attitude toward 
homosexual relationships when it expressly overruled Bowers v. 
Hardwick29 in Lawrence v. Texas.30 However, rather than 
concentrating on the issue of homosexuality, the Court recognized the 
right of all individuals, regardless of sexual preference, to engage in 
sexual relations within the privacy of their own homes.31 In 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,32 the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court went even further in its protection of 
 27. Id. at 220. The Plyler Court observed: 
Persuasive arguments support the view that a State may withhold its beneficence from 
those whose very presence within the United States is the product of their own 
unlawful conduct. These arguments do not apply with the same force to classifications 
imposing disabilities on the minor children of such illegal entrants . . . . Their “parents 
have the ability to conform their conduct to societal norms,” and presumably the 
ability to remove themselves from the State’s jurisdiction; but the children who are 
plaintiffs in these cases “can affect neither their parents’ conduct nor their own status.” 
Id. at 219–20 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)). 
 28. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 964 (Mass. 2003). “It cannot be 
rational under our laws, and indeed it is not permitted, to penalize children by depriving them of 
State benefits because the State disapproves of their parents' sexual orientation.” Id. 
 29. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (finding that Georgia’s sodomy statute does not violate the 
fundamental rights of homosexuals, thereby criminalizing homosexual sex). The majority, 
construing the right and tradition in question narrowly, determined that the asserted right was 
the right to engage in homosexual conduct, and found that there was no specific tradition 
protecting the right to practice homosexual sodomy. Id. at 190–94. The dissent, following the 
lead of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and its broad construction of the 
rights and traditions at stake, found the right in question to be the right to sexual liberty for all, 
not just for homosexuals. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 30. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 31. Id. at 574. “Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these 
purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.” Id. 
The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, 
engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are 
entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or 
control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to 
liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their 
conduct without intervention of the government. 
Id. at 578. 
 32. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 963–64. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol20/iss1/10
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homosexual couples by recognizing the impermissible burdens that 
discriminatory marriage laws place on homosexual couples and their 
children, and by spurring the legislature to legalize gay marriage.33 In 
fact, several states have recognized the rights of homosexuals by 
legalizing gay marriage or by providing for civil unions or domestic 
partnerships.34 
 33. Id. at 969. The court found the hardships on gay parents as a result of being denied the 
right to marry particularly important in its decision. “[T]he task of child rearing for same-sex 
couples is made infinitely harder by their status as outliers to the marriage laws.” Id. at 963. 
“[S]ame-sex couples who dissolve their relationships find themselves and their children in the 
highly unpredictable terrain of equity jurisdiction.” Id.  
 34. In 1997, the Hawaii legislature passed the Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, which 
provides certain rights and privileges to reciprocal beneficiaries that are generally the exclusive 
province of spouses and dependents. 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 383. The law defines reciprocal 
beneficiaries as, inter alia, two adults who are legally prohibited from marrying one another 
under state law, and extends to them many benefits that were previously limited to spouses. Id. 
 In 2003, the highest Massachusetts court, in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 
ruled that same-sex couples have the right to marry under the state’s Constitution. 798 N.E.2d 
941. “The Massachusetts Constitution affirms the dignity and equality of all individuals. It 
forbids the creation of second-class citizens.” Id. at 948. In 1999, Vermont enacted legislation 
providing for civil unions between same-sex partners. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201–07 
(2002). The statute requires: 
For a civil union to be established in Vermont, it shall be necessary that the parties to a 
civil union satisfy all of the following criteria: (1) not be a party to another civil union 
or marriage, (2) Be of the same sex and therefore excluded from the marriage laws of 
this state. 
Id. § 1202.  
 In 2003, California, Maine and New Jersey enacted laws allowing same-sex partnerships. 
California’s legislation allows domestic same-sex couples to register as domestic partners. CAL. 
FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2004). Maine also passed a domestic partnership law. ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 22, § 2710 (2004). The New Jersey Family Equity Act, better known as the Domestic 
Partnership Act (DPA), took effect on July 11, 2004. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A (West 1996 & 
Supp. 2005). The DPA entitles domestic partners to many of the rights enjoyed by spouses. 
“Domestic partner” is now a protected status for purposes of non-discrimination policies. Id. 
Other benefits conferred include visitation rights for a hospitalized domestic partner and the 
right to make medical or legal decisions on behalf of an incapacitated partner; an exemption 
from the personal income tax and the transfer inheritance tax on the same basis as a spouse; 
and, for plans sponsored by the State of New Jersey, health and pension benefits similar to 
those provided to spouses. Id. In addition, domestic partners may now claim joint status for 
state tax purposes pursuant to the DPA. Id. However, there is no equivalent of alimony or 
division of marital assets for domestic partners. Id. Domestic partners are also not included in 
intestate succession schemes. Id. 
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II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE REGARDING THE FITNESS OF HOMOSEXUAL 
PARENTS 
Despite this seemingly broad construction of family, parental 
rights, and the rights of children, homosexual parents have 
historically faced harsh treatment.35 Although some courts have 
assumed that gay men and lesbians are mentally ill for purposes of 
denying custody and visitation, the psychiatric, psychological, and 
social work professions no longer consider homosexuality to be a 
mental disorder.36 Empirical studies show “that parental sexual 
orientation per se has no measurable effect on the quality of parent-
child relationship or on children’s mental health or social 
adjustment,” and suggest that “there is no evidentiary basis for 
 35. See supra note 5. Courts and legislatures have called into question a homosexual 
parent’s fitness in deciding custody disputes and making public policy decisions. However, the 
assumptions that lesbians are less maternal than heterosexual women and that homosexual 
partners devote less time to building and maintaining parent-child bonds have no empirical 
support. See, e.g., Sally L. Kweskin & Alicia S. Cook, Heterosexual and Homosexual Mothers' 
Self-Described Sex-Role Behavior and Ideal Sex-Role Behavior in Children, 8 SEX ROLES 967 
(1982); Terrie A. Lyons, Lesbian Mothers’ Custody Fears, WOMEN & THERAPY, Summer/Fall 
1983, at 231; Judith A. Miller et al., The Child's Home Environment for Lesbian vs. 
Heterosexual Mothers: A Neglected Area of Research, J. HOMOSEXUALITY, Fall 1981, at 49; 
Mildred D. Pagelow, Heterosexual and Lesbian Single Mothers: A Comparison of Problems, 
Coping, and Solutions, 5 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 189 (1980).  
 In addition to harsh treatment from official sources, homosexuals have also faced public 
scrutiny. On November 2, 2004, voters in eleven states approved constitutional amendments 
limiting marriage to one man and one woman. Those states include Arkansas, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ohio, Utah and Oregon. 
11 States Ban Same-Sex Marriage, CBS NEWS, Nov. 2, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
stories/2004/09/30/politics/main646662.shtml. 
 36. In 1973, the American Psychiatric Association removed “homosexuality” from its list 
of mental disorders, commenting that “homosexuality per se implies no impairment in 
judgment, stability, reliability, or general social or vocational capabilities.” Position Statement, 
Am. Psychiatric Assoc., Homosexuality (Dec. 1992), available at http://www.psych.org/edu/ 
other_res/lib_archives/archives/199216.pdf. In 1975, the American Psychological Association 
took the same position and urged all mental health professionals to help dispel the stigma of 
mental illness that had long been associated with homosexual orientation. See AM. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, RESOLUTIONS RELATED TO LESBIAN, GAY AND BISEXUAL ISSUES, 
DSM-III AND HOMOSEXUALITY (1997), available at http://www.apa.org/pi/reslgbc.html. The 
National Association of Social Workers has taken a similar stance. See Nat’l Ass’n of Soc. 
Workers, Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Issues, http://www.naswdc.org/resources/abstracts/ 
abstracts/lesbian.asp (last visited June 1, 2006). 
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considering parental sexual orientation in decisions about children’s 
‘best interest.’”37 
Although it has been difficult to obtain legal recognition of their 
status as couples and their rights as parents, many homosexual 
couples raise children successfully.38 In fact, none of the primary 
 37. Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 5, at 176. 
Given historic societal prejudices against homosexuality, it is not surprising that many 
family court judges are concerned about whether children of lesbian and gay parents 
suffer higher levels of emotional and psychological harm than other children. The 
many studies of ‘children’s self esteem and psychological well-being’ based on 
research tests children directly, as well as those that rely on parents’ accounts or 
teacher evaluations, all find no significant differences between children of lesbian 
mothers and children of heterosexual single or married mothers in anxiety, depression, 
self-esteem, and other measures of social and psychological adjustment. There are 
even a few studies that suggest higher levels of self-esteem and emotional maturity 
among children being raised by lesbian mothers. Children being raised by gay or 
lesbian parents are no different than other children with respect to cognitive 
functioning. Studies that purport to measure levels of parental ‘investment’ in their 
children report levels at least as ‘high’ and sometimes higher for lesbian and gay 
parents than for heterosexual parents. 
Id. at 171. 
 38. “Between eight and fourteen million children are being raised in homes headed by a 
lesbian or gay parent.” Kendell, supra note 5, at 21. 
[In 1998, a]pproximately 160,000 [same-sex] couples reported that they had children 
aged 15 or younger living with them. Because it is difficult to get an estimate of the 
number of single gay or lesbian adults raising minor children, the actual number of 
minor children living with a gay or lesbian parent, with or without a partner, is likely 
to be considerably larger. . . . 
Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Sexual Orientation as a Factor in Adoptive Placements and Overview 
of Second-Parent Adoptions, in 2004 CHILDREN’S LAW MANUAL, at 357, 359 (Nat’l Assoc. of 
Counsel for Children, 2004). 
 Many child welfare and adoption advocacy organizations (for example, the Child Welfare 
League of America and the North American Council on Adoptable Children), as well as 
national professional service and research associations with expertise in child development and 
family dynamics, support the effort to enable homosexual individuals and same-sex couples to 
become parents with full legal rights. See, e.g., Coparent or Second-Parent Adoption by Same-
Sex Parents, 109 PEDIATRICS 339, 339–40 (2002), available at http://aappolicy.aap 
publications.org/cgi/content/full/pediatrics%3b109/2/339. The American Academy of 
Pediatrics’ Committee on Psychosocial Aspects of Child and Family Health observed: 
Children deserve to know that their relationships with both of their parents are stable 
and legally recognized. This applies to all children, whether their parents are of the 
same or opposite sex. The American Academy of Pediatrics recognizes that a 
considerable body of professional literature provides evidence that children with 
parents who are homosexual can have the same advantages and the same expectations 
for health, adjustment, and development as can children whose parents are 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p283 Buethe book pages.doc  7/21/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
292 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 20:283 
 
 
 
concerns of skeptics can be proven by empirical research.39 Children 
of homosexuals develop patterns of behavior, both socially and 
sexually, much like those of other children.40 Michael Wald, 
Professor of Law at Stanford University, found that “[t]he vast 
majority of children in all the studies functioned well intellectually, 
did not engage in self-destructive behavior or in behaviors harmful to 
the community . . . [and got] along as well with their parents and 
peers as children raised in heterosexual families.”41  
III. SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION AND THE EQUITABLE PARENT 
DOCTRINE 
A. Second-Parent Adoption 
To avoid the issue of third parties as parents and the custody and 
visitation problems that arise when a same-sex relationship 
terminates, a growing number of states allow second-parent 
adoption.42 Second-parent adoption protects “children in same-sex 
heterosexual. When 2 [two] adults participate in parenting a child, they and the child 
deserve the serenity that comes with legal recognition. 
Id.  
 39. See supra notes 35–38. The three main concerns over homosexuals raising children 
are that the child’s sexual identity development will be impaired, the child’s personal 
development skills will be impaired, and the child will have difficulty creating and maintaining 
social relationships. See Kendell, supra note 5. 
 40. Hollinger, supra note 38. “Social science research has shown that children raised by 
lesbian and gay parents are just as healthy and well adjusted as those raised by heterosexual 
parents in comparable socio-economic circumstances.” Id. at 357. 
 41. Michael S. Wald, Same-Sex Couples: Marriage, Families, and Children 12 (Stanford 
Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 6, 1999). 
 42. Currently, second-parent adoption has been approved by appellate court decisions in 
the following jurisdictions: California, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Vermont. 
 For the decision in California, see Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003). 
“[A]doption statutes [should] be liberally construed with a view to effect their objects and to 
promote justice. Such a construction should be given as will sustain, rather than defeat, the 
object they have in view.” Id. at 560 (citation omitted). “[T]he Legislature did not intend . . . to 
bar an adoption when the parties clearly intended to waive the operation of that statute and 
agreed to preserve the birth parent's rights and responsibilities.” Id.  
 For the decision in the District of Columbia, see In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995).  
 For the Illinois decision, see In re Petition of K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).  
 For the Indiana decision, see In re Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2003).  
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The appellate court held that, because the adoption statutes did not explicitly prohibit 
adoptions by unmarried couples nor explicitly require that an existing adoptive parent 
relinquish all parental rights when consenting to a second-parent adoption by his or her 
partner, the courts could rely on “Indiana’s common law” to permit a second-parent to 
adopt a child without divesting the rights of the first adoptive parent so long as the trial 
court finds that the proposed adoption is in the best interest of the child. 
Hollinger, supra note 38, at 360 n.18; see also In re Adoption of Infant K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 
1253, 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“It is clear that the divesting statute, designed as a shield to 
protect new adoptive families, was never intended as a sword to prohibit otherwise beneficial 
intrafamily adoption by second parents.”).  
 For the decision of Massachusetts, see Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Mass. 
1993) (“While the Legislature may not have envisioned adoption by same-sex partners, there is 
no indication that it attempted to define all possible categories of persons leading to adoptions 
in the best interests of children. Rather than limit the potential categories of persons entitled to 
adopt . . . , the Legislature used general language to define who may adopt and who may be 
adopted.”). The Massachusetts court described the benefit of a second-parent adoption: 
Adoption will not result in any tangible change in Tammy’s daily life; it will, however, 
serve to provide her with a significant legal relationship which may be important in her 
future. At the most practical level, adoption will entitle Tammy to inherit from Helen's 
family trusts and from Helen and her family under the law of intestate succession . . ., 
to receive support from Helen, who will be legally obligated to provide such support 
. . ., to be eligible for coverage under Helen’s health insurance policies, and to be 
eligible for social security benefits in the event of Helen's disability or death. . . . 
 Of equal, if not greater significance, adoption will enable Tammy to preserve her 
unique filial ties to Helen in the event that Helen and Susan separate, or Susan 
predeceases Helen. As the case law and commentary on the subject illustrate, when the 
functional parents of children born in circumstances similar to Tammy separate or one 
dies, the children often remain in legal limbo for years while their future is disputed in 
the courts. In some cases, children have been denied the affection of a functional 
parent who has been with them since birth, even when it is apparent that this outcome 
is contrary to the children's best interests. Adoption serves to establish legal rights and 
responsibilities so that, in the event that problems arise in the future, issues of custody 
and visitation may be promptly resolved by reference to the best interests of the child 
within the recognized framework of the law. 
Id. at 320–21 (citations omitted).  
 For the New Jersey decision, see In re Adoption of Two Children, 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).  
 For the decision of New York, see In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995). “[T]he 
adoption statute must be applied in harmony with the humanitarian principle that adoption is a 
means of securing the best possible home for a child.” Id. at 399; see also In re Adoption of 
Carolyn B., 774 N.Y.S.2d 227 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (allowing two unmarried adults to adopt 
jointly, rather than sequentially).  
 For Pennsylvania’s decision, see In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002).  
 For the decision in Vermont, see In re Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt. 
1993) (“When social mores change, governing statutes must be interpreted to allow for those 
changes in a manner that does not frustrate the purposes behind their enactment. To deny the 
children of same-sex partners, as a class, the security of a legally recognized relationship with 
their second parent serves no legitimate state interest.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p283 Buethe book pages.doc  7/21/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
294 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 20:283 
 
 
 
parent families by giving the child the legal security of having two 
legal parents.”43 It “also protects the rights of the co-parents, by 
ensuring that the co-parent will continue to have a legally recognized 
parental relationship to the child if the couple separates or if the 
biological parent (or original adoptive parent) dies or becomes 
incapacitated.”44  
To provide these benefits to same-sex couples and their children, 
some courts have chosen to read existing adoption statutes broadly to 
allow for second-parent adoption.45 Other courts, such as Missouri, 
instead restrict adoption by applying a very narrow reading of the 
current statutory language. To avoid the need for judges to massage 
the language of outdated statutes to obtain the desired result, some 
states expressly authorize second-parent adoptions.46  
The toughest barrier that courts have had to overcome in 
recognizing second-parent adoptions via existing adoption statutes is 
the cut-off provision, which requires termination of birth parents’ 
rights prior to adoption proceedings.47 Courts have used a variety of 
interpretive strategies to circumvent these provisions. Some courts 
hold that reading the adoption laws so as to require termination of the 
 43. Hollinger, supra note 38, at 358. 
 44. Id. at 359. 
 45. See supra note 42. Trial courts in Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
Texas and Washington have granted second-parent adoptions. Hollinger, supra note 38, at 363. 
 46. Currently, second-parent adoption is available by statute in California, Connecticut 
and Vermont. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(f) (West 2004) (allowing only for registered 
domestic partners); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-724(a)(3) (West 2004) (superceding In re 
Adoption of Baby Z, 724 A.2d 1035 (Conn. 1999)); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (2002) 
(codifying Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271). These statutes are based on the Uniform 
Adoption Act, which recognizes the right of anyone to attempt to adopt in order to create a 
parent-child relationship. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 1-102 (1994). 
 47. The New York adoption statute provides an example of a typical provision, commonly 
referred to as a cut-off provision, terminating the rights of a natural parent. It provides that 
“[a]fter the making of an order of adoption the natural parents of the adoptive child . . . shall 
have no rights over such adoptive child.” N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117(1)(a) (McKinney 1999); 
see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 6 (West 1999) (“[A]ll rights, duties and other legal 
consequences of the natural relation of child and parent shall . . . terminate between the child so 
adopted and his natural parents and kindred.”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.92(2) (West 1997) 
(“After the order of adoption is entered the relationship of parent and child between the adopted 
person and the adopted person’s birth parents, unless the birth parent is the spouse of the 
adoptive parent, shall be completely altered and all the rights, duties and other legal 
consequences of the relationship shall cease to exist.”).  
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rights of a parent who intends to raise the child in conjunction with 
the adoptive parent violates the rule proscribing “absurd results” 
when interpreting statutes.48 Other courts point to the legislative 
mandate of liberal interpretation of statutory language as “directory” 
rather than “mandatory” to ignore the termination of parental rights 
provision.49  
Following similar reasoning as those courts that use adoption 
statutes as guides rather than as strict rules, the Illinois Court of 
Appeals recently refused to apply the state’s cut-off provision 
because the adoption statute instructed liberal construction by the 
courts and mandated the use of the best interests of the child 
standard.50 As an alternate interpretive tool, two courts have found 
that the cut-off provisions were never intended to apply when a legal 
parent participated in the adoption.51 Finally, some courts have 
recognized the similarities between lesbian co-parents and step-
parents, and have held that provisions waiving the requirements for 
step-parents should apply to co-parents as well.52 
Unfortunately, appellate courts have denied second-parent 
adoptions in a few states.53 In addition, some states have passed 
 48. See In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 845 (D.C. 1995) (“The canon in favor of strict 
construction is not an inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory 
purpose. . . . [T]he canon does not require distortion or nullification of the evident meaning and 
purpose of the legislation.”) (citing United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25–26 (1948)); In re 
Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 539 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) 
(“When the statute is read as a whole, we see that its general purpose is to clarify and protect 
the legal rights of the adopted person at the time the adoption is complete, not to proscribe 
adoptions by certain combinations of individuals. . . . The legislature recognized that it would 
be against common sense to terminate the biological parent's rights when that parent will 
continue to raise and be responsible for the child, albeit in a family unit with a partner who is 
biologically unrelated to the child.”); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 402–06 (N.Y. 1995); 
Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1272–74 (Vt. 1993). 
 49. In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 691–92 (Wis. 1994) (Heffernan, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 50. In re K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 892–95 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
 51. M.M.D., 662 A.2d at 860–62; Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 1993) 
(“The Legislature obviously did not intend that a natural parent’s legal relationship to its child 
be terminated when the natural parent is a party to the adoption petition.”). 
 52. See M.M.D., 662 A.2d at 860–61; Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 405 (stating that the cut-off 
provision was “designed as a shield to protect new adoptive families [and] was never intended 
as a sword to prohibit otherwise beneficial intrafamily adoptions by second parents”). 
 53. Courts in Colorado, Nebraska, Ohio, and Wisconsin have held that a parent who 
consents to the adoption of his or her child mandatorily terminates his or her parental rights and 
duties. See In re Adoption of T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); In re Adoption of 
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statutory prohibitions against adoptions by homosexual individuals 
and couples.54 At least one state has gone even further by enacting a 
statute refusing to recognize adoptions granted to same-sex couples 
in other states.55 The reluctance of courts, combined with the threat of 
legislation expressly prohibiting homosexual adoption, is the most 
serious problem facing efforts to recognize the validity of same-sex 
co-parents. Without the legal protection of adoption, non-legal 
parents and their children face serious disadvantages and possible 
health risks.56  
B. The Equitable Parent Doctrine 
Without second-parent adoption, courts are forced to determine 
the custody and visitation rights of same-sex couples by invoking (or 
not invoking) their equitable authority. Some courts refuse to 
recognize the parental rights of a homosexual partner and insist on 
treating the partner as a stranger.57 This gives the legal parent the 
Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374 (Neb. 2002); In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1998); Angel Lace, 516 N.W.2d 678. 
 54. See FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2002) (“No person eligible to adopt under this statute 
may adopt if that person is a homosexual.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1(3)(b) (2002) 
(prohibiting “a person who is cohabitating in a relationship that is not a legally valid and 
binding marriage under the laws of this state” from adopting). 
 55. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7502-1.4(A) (1998 & Supp. 2005). In May 2004, the Oklahoma 
legislature amended the adoption statute to read: 
The courts of this state shall recognize a decree, judgment, or final order creating the 
relationship of parent and child by adoption, issued by a court or other governmental 
authority with appropriate jurisdiction in a foreign country or in another state or 
territory of the United States. The rights and obligations of the parties as to matters 
within the jurisdiction of this state shall be determined as though the decree, judgment, 
or final order were issued by a court of this state. Except that, this state, any of its 
agencies, or any court of this state shall not recognize an adoption by more than one 
individual of the same sex from any other state or foreign jurisdiction. 
Id. 
 However, other courts have explicitly confirmed recognition of second-parent adoptions 
approved in other states. See Russell v. Bridgens, 647 N.W.2d 56, 59 (Neb. 2002) (“A judgment 
rendered in a sister state court which had jurisdiction is to be given full faith and credit and has 
the same validity and effect in Nebraska as in the state rendering judgment.”). 
 56. There are serious consequences of failing to recognize the rights of co-parents. The 
child may be ineligible for health insurance, life insurance or disability benefits through the co-
parent’s employer, and, without a will, are unable to inherit from the co-parent. The co-parent is 
also unable to consent to emergency medical procedures or to obtain school records. 
 57. See, e.g., Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Kazmierazak v. 
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absolute right to deny the ex-partner custody or visitation with the 
child. 
However, a growing number of courts have recognized that a 
partner is not a stranger, and that a legal tie is all that separates a 
child and the partner from a legal parent-child relationship.58 These 
courts recognize the equitable parent doctrine59 and award visitation 
or custody to non-legal parents based on their involvement in the 
child’s life, rather than strictly on legal or biological ties.60 The 
doctrine of equitable parenthood was established in Atkinson v. 
Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that lesbian former partner had no 
right to custody of child); Liston v. Pyles, No. 97APF01-137, 1997 WL 467327 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Aug. 12, 1997) (holding that applicable statutes granted no legal parenting rights to partner). 
Other courts have recognized a former partner as more than a mere third party. See Gestl v. 
Frederick, 754 A.2d 1087 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000); LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
 58. See infra note 60. 
 59. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST 
DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE (1996). 
Whether a person becomes the psychological parent of a child is based on day-to-day 
interaction, companionship, and shared experiences. This can be done by an adoptive 
parent, or by any other caring person—but never by a physically or psychologically 
absent person, whatever the person’s biological or legal relationship to the child may 
be. 
Id. at 12–13. 
Unlike adults, children have no psychological conception of blood-tie relationships 
until quite late in their development . . . What matters to them is the pattern of day-to-
day interchanges with the adults who take care of them and who, on the strength of 
such interactions, become the parent figures to whom they are attached. 
Id. at 9. 
An ‘equitable parent’ is an individual who provides for the physical, emotional, and 
social needs of a child and demonstrates that (1) he had physical custody of the child 
for an extended period, (2) his motive in seeking parental status is his genuine care and 
concern for the child, and (3) his relationship with the child began with the consent of 
the child’s legal parent. 
In re T.L, No. 953-2340, 1996 WL 393521, at *2 (Mo. Cir. May 7, 1996); see also Alison D. v. 
Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 32 (N.Y. 1991); In re Allen, 626 P.2d 16, 21 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1981). 
 60. See, e.g., In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004); C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 
A.2d 1146 (Me. 2004); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 
A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000) (granting mother’s former partner visitation based on equitable parent 
doctrine); J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 
959 (R.I. 2000); In re Parentage of L.B., 89 P.3d 271 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004); In re H.S.H-K., 
533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995). 
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Atkinson,61 in which the court granted rights to the mother’s husband 
based on his relationship with the child, not on his relationship with 
the mother.62  
One hesitation in recognizing the equitable parent doctrine is that 
it may open the door to allowing anyone to claim a relationship with 
a child and seek visitation. This would, in turn, undermine the idea of 
family and strip biological and legal parents of their rights to guide 
the upbringing of their children.63 However, by adopting a specific, 
detailed definition of an equitable parent, courts can differentiate 
between a total stranger and a legal stranger. 
Courts traditionally employ a four-part test to determine whether 
an individual should be recognized under the equitable parent 
doctrine.64 The four factors include: consent from the biological or 
legally adoptive parent, living with the child, performing parental 
functions, and the existence of a parent-child bond.65 These four 
factors illustrate the necessity of intent when forming a bond with a 
 61. 408 N.W.2d 516 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); see also Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does 
Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother 
and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 483 (1990).  
 62. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d at 519. The court adopted a three-prong test to determine 
whether a father qualifies as an equitable parent. Id. A person qualifies as an equitable parent if: 
(1) the husband and the child mutually acknowledge a relationship as father and child, 
or the mother of the child has cooperated in the development of such a relationship 
over a period of time prior to the filing of the complaint for divorce, (2) the husband 
desires to have the rights afforded to a parent, and (3) the husband is willing to take on 
the responsibility of paying child support. 
Id. 
 63. See Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie that Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to 
Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358, 394 (1994). 
 64. H.S.H-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421. 
 65. Id. The court’s statement of these factors is as follows: 
To demonstrate the existence of the petitioner's parent-like relationship with the child, 
the petitioner must prove four elements: (1) that the biological or adoptive parent 
consented to, and fostered, the petitioner's formation and establishment of a parent-like 
relationship with the child; (2) that the petitioner and the child lived together in the 
same household; (3) that the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by taking 
significant responsibility for the child's care, education and development, including 
contributing towards the child's support, without expectation of financial 
compensation; and (4) that the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of 
time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship 
parental in nature. 
Id.  
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non-biological child. Intent has been a crucial factor in a number of 
decisions involving separation and custody and visitation.66 
The relevancy of a homosexual relationship in custody and 
visitation disputes has traditionally been determined using one of 
three different methods.67 Some courts adopt the per se rule, in which 
proof of a parent’s homosexuality disqualifies the parent from 
custody without any consideration of the best interest of the child or 
the fitness of the other parent.68 Other courts apply a presumption of 
harm rule based solely on the fact that a parent is involved in a 
homosexual relationship, and place the burden on the homosexual 
parent to prove the absence of harm.69 Most courts, however, apply 
the nexus test,70 which is influenced by the Uniform Marriage and 
Divorce Act.71 This test requires that a connection, or nexus, between 
a homosexual parent’s conduct and negative impact on the child must 
be established before homosexual conduct is given relevance.72  
 66. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (holding that when all else is 
equal, the court must look at the intent of the parties to determine motherhood); Marvin v. 
Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 121 (Cal. 1976) (finding that the applicable remedy is to carry out the 
reasonable expectations of the parties); In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1998). 
 67. D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 824, 824–27 n.3 (2d ed. 2002). 
 68. See Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985). The per se rule does not require a 
showing of harm to the child. Id. at 692. 
 69. See Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987).  
 70. Stephen B. Pershing, “Entreat Me Not to Leave Thee”: Bottoms v. Bottoms and the 
Custody Rights of Gay and Lesbian Parents, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 289, 308 (1994).  
 71. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 282 (1970). This section states: 
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the child. The 
court shall consider all relevant factors including: (1) the wishes of the child’s parent 
or parents as to his custody; (2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian; (3) the 
interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his siblings, 
and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interest; (4) the 
child’s adjustment to his home, school, and community; and (5) the mental and 
physical health of all individuals involved. The court shall not consider conduct of a 
proposed custodian that does not affect his relationship to the child. 
Id. In addition to the UMDA, the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family 
Dissolution does not allow a court to consider a parent’s sexual orientation or extramarital 
sexual conduct except when that conduct causes harm to the child. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW 
OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.12(1)(d), (e) (2002) 
(discussing sexual orientation and extramarital sexual conduct, respectively).  
 72. See, e.g., A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 664-65 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992). 
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States have taken many different approaches in applying the 
equitable parent doctrine.73 Colorado’s appellate court has denied 
second-parent adoptions,74 but recognizes the equitable parent 
doctrine as a basis for granting joint custody to same-sex partners.75 
For example, In re E.L.M.C. held that a former partner had standing 
as a psychological parent to petition for equal parenting time, and that 
the compelling state interest of preventing emotional harm to the 
child justified interference with the adoptive mother’s due process 
right to make decisions concerning her child’s care.76 New Jersey 
also recognizes the equitable parent doctrine.77 For example, in V.C. 
v. M.J.B, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the importance 
of a third party’s psychological bond to a child and awarded 
visitation based on the equitable parent doctrine.78  
In 1999, the Massachusetts Supreme Court awarded visitation to a 
parent’s ex-partner and declared that a biological or legal parent’s 
rights do not allow the parent to deny visitation to (and effectively 
end a child’s relationship with) a former partner when the parties 
signed and adhered to a co-parenting agreement.79 California does not 
[T]he issue before the court is not the nature of the parent's sexual activities, if any, but 
whether and how those activities affect the child, if in fact they do. This is a factual 
issue that must be considered and resolved on specific evidence concerning the effect, 
if any, of the activity on the children; it cannot be resolved as a matter of law based on 
the perceived morality or immorality of the parent's conduct. 
Id. 
 73. See infra notes 74–80. 
 74. In re Adoption of T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996). 
 75. In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004). 
 76. Id. at 561. “[W]e . . . conclude that emotional harm to a young child is intrinsic in the 
termination or significant curtailment of the child's relationship with a psychological parent 
under any definition of that term.” Id. 
 77. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000). 
 78. Id. at 555. 
 At the heart of the psychological parent cases is a recognition that children have a 
strong interest in maintaining the ties that connect them to adults who love and provide 
for them. That interest, for constitutional as well as social purposes, lies in the 
emotional bonds that develop between family members as a result of shared daily life. 
Id. at 550. 
 79. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 892–93 (Mass. 1999). A “cohabitating couple can 
contract regarding the rights of their children so long as the judge determines that the terms 
reflect the child's best interests.” Id. at 892 (citing Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141, 147 
(Mass. 1998)). 
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recognize the equitable parent doctrine because the legislature 
enacted a statute explicitly allowing second-parent adoptions for 
registered domestic partners, thereby negating the need for the 
doctrine.80 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE TREATMENT OF HOMOSEXUAL PARENTS 
REGARDING CUSTODY ISSUES IN MISSOURI 
Despite the national trend of according rights to homosexual 
parents, Missouri has a long history of harsh treatment of gay and 
lesbian parents in custody and visitation disputes.81 Missouri courts 
apply a much higher level of scrutiny to the behavior of homosexuals 
than to that of heterosexuals.82 Traditionally, Missouri has applied the 
best interests standard83 and the presumption of harm rule. However, 
 80. CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(f) (West 2004). “For the purposes of this chapter, stepparent 
adoption includes adoption by a domestic partner.” Id.  
 81. See Delong v. Delong, No. WD 52726, 1998 WL 15536, at *6 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 
1998); T.C.H. v. K.M.H., 784 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding severe visitation restrictions despite weak evidentiary basis 
that father and homosexual lover held hands and kissed in front of the child); G.A. v. D.A., 745 
S.W.2d 726, 727 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that evidence indicating that mother was a 
lesbian “tipped the scales,” and awarding custody to the father); S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 
164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (modifying custody order upon receipt of evidence of mother’s 
homosexual relationship); J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 870–72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) 
(limiting visitation of gay father by not allowing overnight visits, attendance at gay activist 
social gatherings, or attendance at church with a large homosexual congregation); L. v. D., 630 
S.W.2d 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (awarding custody to unemotional, transient father, and 
limiting visitation of lesbian mother despite child’s wishes to get away from father); N.K.M. v. 
L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). 
 82. Lisa A. Brunner, Circumventing the “Best Interests of the Child” Standard: Child 
Custody Law in Missouri as Applied to Homosexual Parents, 55 J. MO. B. 200, 203 (1999). 
Rather than focusing solely on the sexual behavior of heterosexual parents, the court based its 
decision on a variety a factors, and looked for a showing of an adverse effect on the children. 
Id. at 202. In some cases, courts award custody to adulterous spouses or to persons in 
unmarried, cohabitating relationships by looking beyond their sexual conduct and evaluating 
their behavior based on the best interests of the child. See Morrison v. Morrison, 676 S.W.2d 
279 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (granting mother custody despite her cohabitation with man to whom 
she was not married); see also Indermuehle v. Babbitt, 771 S.W.2d 873 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).  
 83. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375.2 (1997). This section provides:  
In determining the best interests of the child, the court shall consider all relevant 
factors including the wishes of the child as to his custody; the interaction and 
interrelationship of the child with his parents, his siblings, and any other person who 
may significantly affect the child’s best interests; the child’s adjustment to his home, 
school, and community; the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, 
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some courts’ application of the best interests standard does not seem 
to be any different from the per se approach.84 This perception is 
reinforced by the fact that between 1980 and 1989, Missouri 
appellate courts decided seven cases involving homosexual conduct 
and child custody and visitation; in each case, the court upheld the 
trial court’s award of custody to the heterosexual parent and restricted 
or denied visitation to the homosexual partner.85  
Missouri courts have also refused to use available methods to 
circumvent the restrictive language of the state’s current adoption 
statute. The Missouri legislature has exacerbated the situation by 
failing to amend its current adoption statute to explicitly allow 
second-parent adoptions. However, the legislature has taken positive 
steps in this direction by showing friendliness toward third-party 
custody and visitation in child custody battles,86 and by adopting the 
best interests of the child standard to protect children in custody 
disputes.87 Missouri has also adopted a public policy in favor of the 
welfare of the child in custody determinations.88 
including any history of abuse of any individuals involved . . .; the needs of the child 
for a continuing relationship with both parents and the ability and willingness of 
parents to actively perform their functions as mother and father for the needs of the 
child; the intention of either parent to relocate his residence outside the state; and 
which parent is more likely to allow the child frequent and meaningful contact with the 
other parent.  
Id. 
 84. G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726. The court did not examine the father’s home 
environment and ignored the mother’s statement under oath that she would discourage her child 
from engaging in a homosexual relationship. Id. at 729 (Lowenstein, J., dissenting). 
 85. See supra note 81. 
 86. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375.5 (1997). 
Prior to awarding the appropriate custody arrangement in the best interest of the child, 
the court shall consider . . . [t]hird-party custody or visitation . . . custody . . . may be 
awarded to any other person or persons deemed by the court to be suitable and able to 
provide an adequate and stable environment for the child. 
Id. 
 87. Supra note 83. 
 88. Section 452.375.4 of the Missouri statutes states:  
The general assembly finds and declares that it is public policy of this state that 
frequent, continuing and meaningful contact with both parents after the parents have 
separated or dissolved their marriage is in the best interest of a child, except for cases 
where the court specifically finds that such contact is not in the best interest of the 
child, and that it is the public policy of this state to encourage parents to participate in 
decisions affecting the health, education and welfare of their children. 
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A few recent Missouri cases illustrate a movement toward 
recognizing the rights of gay and lesbian parents and their partners.89 
For example, in 1998, the Missouri Supreme Court declared that a 
homosexual parent is not ipso facto unfit for custody.90 In 2003, a 
trial court judge awarded visitation to a non-biological father based 
on fairness and the welfare of the child.91 
The most promising Missouri case regarding non-parents’ rights 
in a same-sex relationship is In re T.L.92 In T.L., a Missouri circuit 
court recognized the equitable parent doctrine.93 Although the 
decision does not constitute binding precedent for other custody and 
visitation cases, it provides an example of how a court can 
circumvent previous negative court decisions and legislation to 
produce a fair result for homosexual parents and their children.  
In arriving at its decision, the T.L. court recognized the problems 
presented by “[s]ocial fragmentation and the myriad configurations of 
the modern family.”94 “Courts must recognize that custody and 
visitation disputes no longer occur only between heterosexual 
couples,” and these issues must be resolved “in a way which 
minimizes the detriment a child suffers.”95 Further, “[c]ourts must be 
ever cognizant of the child’s need for stability in his life and 
continuity in his personal relationships.”96 To manage the changing 
family dynamic, the T.L. court recommended the adoption of a “more 
MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375.4 (1997). 
 89. See J.A.D. v. F.J.D. III, 978 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1998); In re T.L., No. 953-2340, 1996 
WL 393521 (Mo. Cir. May 7, 1996). 
 90. J.A.D., 978 S.W.2d at 339.  
 91. See Kelly Kress, Man Wasn’t Father But Is Awarded Visitation: Biological Dad Was 
in Prison for Homicide, MO. LAW. WKLY., Feb. 17, 2003 (discussing Gain. v. Gain, MLW No. 
32646 (Mo. Co. Cir. Ct., Feb. 4, 2003)). 
It is clear to the court that under the unique facts of this case the welfare of the child 
requires that Husband be awarded third party custody rights . . . . The person would be 
hurt most severely by cutting off any relationship between [the girl] and Husband is 
[the girl]. It’s just not fair to [the girl] to have to suffer this additional grief. 
Id. 
 92. T.L., 1996 WL 393521, at *1. 
 93. Id. at *2. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p283 Buethe book pages.doc  7/21/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
304 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 20:283 
 
 
 
flexible ‘functional approach’”97 in which a family is defined by 
“determining whether a relationship shares the essential 
characteristics of a traditionally accepted relationship, such as 
economic cooperation, participation in domestic responsibilities, and 
affection between the parties.”98  
In adopting the equitable parent doctrine, however, the T.L. court 
did not simply overrule a biological or legal parent’s right to custody 
in favor of the child’s best interest. The court balanced parental 
custodial rights and the right to choose with whom a child associates 
against the “state’s interest as parens patriae in the child’s welfare.”99 
In doing so, the court adopted the actual detriment to the child test,100 
a middle ground between the best interests of the child and the 
parental unfitness test.101 As part of the balance, the court stressed the 
serious problem of public scrutiny and private biases,102 and 
 97. Id. The court opposed the “traditional, stricter ‘formal approach’ for defining family” 
because it “defines family according to the traditional nuclear model and, therefore, recognizes 
only individuals related to each other by blood, adoption, or marriage.” Id.  
 98. Id. The term family should be defined in the context of modern relationships. Id. It is a 
“continuing relationship of love and care, and an assumption of responsibility for some other 
person.” Id. (quoting In re Adult Anonymous II, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198, 201 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1982)). 
 99. Id. at *3. 
 100. In re Allen, 626 P.2d 16, 23 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981). 
[T]o give custody to a nonparent there must be more than the ‘best interests of the 
child’ involved, but less than a showing of unfitness. In extraordinary circumstances, 
where placing the child with an otherwise fit parent would be detrimental to the child, 
the parent’s right to custody is outweighed by the state’s interest in the child’s welfare. 
There must be a showing of actual detriment to the child, something greater than the 
comparative and balancing analysis of the ‘best interests of the child’ test. 
Id. 
 101. T.L., 1996 WL 393521, at *3. “The ‘best interests’ test does not adequately protect a 
biological parent’s primary right to custody and the ‘parental unfitness’ test does not 
sufficiently protect a minor child’s welfare . . . .” Id. 
 102. Id. 
Discrimination toward individuals who do not conform with mainstream society is a 
serious problem [that cannot be ignored.] . . . Courts can no longer directly or 
indirectly give private biases effect; i.e., the Court may not deprive A.L. of custody of 
or visitation with the minor child simply because she pursues a life-style at odds with 
the norm. 
Id. at *3; see also Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (holding that “[t]he Constitution 
cannot control such [racial] prejudices but neither can it tolerate them”). Contra G.A. v. D.A., 
745 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that homosexuality “can never be kept 
private enough to be a neutral factor in the development of a child’s values and character”); 
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suggested that although a parent’s sexual orientation “is not a 
permissible basis for the denial of custody or visitation,” it should be 
considered in determining the needs of the child.103 
In applying the functional approach and the actual detriment to the 
child test, the T.L. court found that “A.L. [(the homosexual partner)] 
and the minor child have formed a family unit, and . . . disruption of 
that stability and continuity by elimination of contact between A.L. 
and the minor child will result in actual detriment to the minor 
child.”104 Based on this finding and despite the lack of statutory 
authority, the court exercised its equitable authority by applying the 
equitable parent doctrine, thereby awarding visitation rights to A.L.105  
V. PROPOSAL FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN MISSOURI LAW 
The issue of homosexual parenting is not a matter of condoning 
homosexual behavior; it is a human rights issue involving children 
who do not deserve to be harmed because of a moral disagreement as 
to their parents’ choices. In fact, research indicates that it is more 
traumatic for a child to lose a parental figure, such as when courts do 
not recognize same-sex relationships, than it is to be raised by a 
homosexual parent.106 Unfortunately, homosexual parents, 
particularly in Missouri, are often treated differently despite evidence 
of their ability to successfully raise children.107 To avoid this, 
Missouri courts and legislators should follow the analysis set forth by 
S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (“We wish to protect the children 
from peer pressure, teasing, and possible ostracizing they may encounter as a result of the 
‘alternative life style’ their mother has chosen.”); M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1979) (noting that exposure to embarrassment is not simply a product of who a child 
lives with, but rather a product of the identity of the child’s parents). 
 103. T.L., 1996 WL 393521, at *4. “Homosexuality in and of itself should not be a bar to 
custody or to reasonable rights of visitation, which must be determined with reference to the 
needs of the child rather than the sexual preferences of the parent.” Id.; see also A.C. v. C.B., 
829 P.2d 660, 664 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992). 
 104. T.L., 1996 WL 393521, at *4.  
 105. Id. at *5. During periods of physical custody, both women were restricted from having 
any unrelated person over the age of twelve spend the night. Id. at *7. 
 106. See supra notes 35, 37–41. 
 107. See supra note 82. 
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In re T.L.108 to recognize a functional parent-child relationship 
intentionally created by a legally recognized parent.  
The Supreme Court has paved the way for the recognition of 
rights and responsibilities of members of nontraditional families.109 
The Court has recognized the existence of the nontraditional family, 
advocated for a broad interpretation of the term family, protected the 
rights of both parents and children, and recognized the privacy rights 
of homosexuals.110 In addition to the guidance provided by the 
Supreme Court, legislators and courts across the country have 
expanded the rights of homosexuals as couples and as parents,111 and 
researchers have shown that homosexuals can be successful 
parents.112  
There is little argument against deference to the decisions of fit 
parents as to their children’s upbringing. However, courts should 
expand their definitions of parent to include a psychological parent, 
so as to avoid punishing children for the choices of their parents. 
When a homosexual couple legally barred from marriage or adoption 
agrees, nonetheless, to raise a child together, that child should not 
have to lose the love and support of one parent if the couple later 
decides to end their relationship. At the same time, the rights and 
responsibilities of parenthood should not be given without careful 
analysis of the relationship between the putative parent and the child, 
as demonstrated in In re T.L.113 A third party stranger should not 
overrule a biological parent’s rights without a sufficient parent-like 
relationship to the child.  
The ideal solution to this issue is statutory reform. Although 
Missouri judges can circumvent the state’s current legislation to grant 
 108. For a discussion of the court’s analysis, see supra notes 93–103. 
 109. See supra notes 7–31. 
 110. Id.  
 111. See supra notes 33–34, 42, 45–46, 58.  
 112. See supra note 38. 
 113. In re T.L., No. 953-2340, 1996 WL 393521, at *2 (Mo. Cir. May 7, 1996). 
A.L. has proven by clear and convincing evidence that (1) she and the minor child 
mutually acknowledge a relationship as parent and child, (2) Y.R. cooperated in the 
development of the parent-child relationship, (3) she desires to have the rights afforded 
to a parent, and (4) she is willing to take on the responsibility of supporting the minor 
child. 
Id.  
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rights and responsibilities to homosexual parents, the legislature 
should take a hard look at its current adoption statute and revise the 
wording to provide an alternative to the cut-off provision,114 or to 
explicitly allow second-parent adoption. This would decrease the 
burden on the court system by avoiding the uncertainty of applying 
equitable remedies, and would align the Missouri adoption statute 
with the state’s interest in protecting the child115 and with the nation’s 
interest in promoting pluralism.116  
Unfortunately, the Missouri legislature has been slow to recognize 
the rights of homosexuals, and Missouri citizens have illustrated their 
animus towards gays by passing a ban on gay marriage.117 As 
individuals who witness the effects of the current legislation and 
policies on homosexual parents, Missouri judges should not wait for 
the legislature to reform its statutes to broaden the definition of 
parenthood and adoption eligibility. Lack of legislation is not an 
excuse to avoid the issue. In fact, Missouri courts face the 
controversy of non-traditional familial and parenting arrangements on 
a regular basis. However, most courts have recognized the rights of 
third parties in cases in which heterosexual parents are involved, but 
 114. Missouri’s cut-off provision is similar to that of other states. See supra note 34. 
Section 453.090.1 of the Missouri statutes states: 
When a child is adopted in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, all legal 
relationships and all rights and duties between such child and his natural parents (other 
than a natural parent who joins in the petition for adoption as provided in section 
453.010) shall cease and determine. Such child shall thereafter be deemed and held to 
be for every purpose the child of his parent or parents by adoption, as fully as though 
born to him or them in lawful wedlock. 
MO. REV. STAT. § 453.090.1 (1997).  
 115. See supra notes 83 and 88.  
 116. See supra note 11. 
 117. MO. CONST. art. I, § 33 (amended 2004). “That to be valid and recognized in this 
state, a marriage shall exist only between a man and a woman.” Id.; see also MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 451.022 (2004). 
1. It is the public policy of this state to recognize marriage only between a man and a 
woman. 2. Any purported marriage not between a man and a woman is invalid. 3. No 
recorder shall issue a marriage license, except to a man and a woman. 4. A marriage 
between persons of the same sex will not be recognized for any purpose in this state 
even when valid where contracted. 
Id.  
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have not applied an equal standard to cases involving homosexual 
parents.118 
Despite facing these same obstacles, many other state courts have 
found ways to award rights and responsibilities to homosexual 
parents, and Missouri should do the same. Many courts construe their 
current adoption statutes to include second-parent adoptions,119 in 
which the legal or biological parent does not have to give up his or 
her rights and responsibilities. Others find the situation of a 
homosexual parent similar to that of a step-parent, and apply the step-
parent exception.120 Other courts ignore the statutory language and 
rely instead on principles of equity and fairness by applying the 
equitable parent doctrine to award rights and responsibilities to ex-
partners who meet established criteria.121 
The judge in In re T.L. faced the challenge of homosexual parents’ 
rights head on, employed the equitable parent doctrine, and set an 
example for Missouri judges and legislators alike. Missouri courts 
should adopt the functional test set forth by In re T.L., and should 
balance the rights of the legal parent against the best interests of the 
child to determine the outcome of these difficult cases. The key is to 
respect parental autonomy, but to limit it when the child is at risk of 
having a parental figure cast out of his or her life. 
The analysis in In re T.L, Missouri’s public policy in favor of the 
welfare of the child in custody determinations, and the increasing 
recognition of the rights of homosexuals throughout the United States 
provide hope that Missouri will continue to improve its treatment of 
gays and lesbians in custody and visitation conflicts. However, 
homosexual parents in Missouri should not rely on this hope. To 
guard against the absence of statutory or equitable remedies, same-
sex couples should plan ahead by drafting agreements regarding 
parental responsibilities, including their intention to continue co-
parenting in the event the relationship ends. Couples who have 
entered into such agreements must then honor them; the alternative—
taking their chances in court—currently carries unacceptable risks. 
 118. See supra notes 82–85. 
 119. See supra notes 48–51. 
 120. Supra note 52. 
 121. See supra note 60. 
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CONCLUSION 
Homosexual couples who plan families together and later 
terminate their relationship should not face stricter standards simply 
because they are in the vanguard of an era in which family structure 
is changing and tradition is being redefined. A child’s well-being and 
the opportunity to be raised in a loving, stable environment, in 
Missouri and in all other states, should be the most important factor 
in determining custody and visitation. A person who is lacking only a 
legal or biological tie to be recognized as a parent should have an 
opportunity to gain custody or visitation rights regardless of his or 
her sexual orientation. If Missouri will not allow gay marriage or 
second-parent adoption, it should recognize the equitable parent 
doctrine to protect its children. 
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